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E N V I R O N M E N T A L  S T U D I E S
Leverage points in the financial sector for  
seafood sustainability
Jean-Baptiste Jouffray1,2*, Beatrice Crona1,2, Emmy Wassénius1,2,  
Jan Bebbington3, Bert Scholtens4,5
Can finance contribute to seafood sustainability? This is an increasingly relevant question given the projected 
growth of seafood markets and the magnitude of social and environmental challenges associated with seafood 
production. As more capital enters the seafood industry, it becomes crucial that investments steer the sector 
toward improved sustainability, as opposed to fueling unsustainable working conditions and overexploitation of 
resources. Using a mixed-methods approach, we map where different financial mechanisms are most salient 
along a seafood firm’s development trajectory and identify three leverage points that can redirect capital toward 
more sustainable practices: loan covenants, stock exchange listing rules, and shareholder activism. We argue that 
seafood sustainability requirements need to be integrated into traditional financial services and propose key 
research avenues for academic, policy, and practice communities. While our study focuses on the role of finance 
in seafood sustainability, the insights developed are also of high relevance to other extractive industries.
INTRODUCTION
Seafood is increasingly regarded as an important component of the 
global food portfolio to meet the nutritional demands of a growing 
population within environmental limits (1). Since the 1960s, aqua-
culture has been the world’s fastest growing food production system, 
rates of fish consumption have been increasing twice as rapidly as 
population growth, and fish has become one of the most traded food 
commodities (1, 2). However, today’s seafood production suffers from 
a number of sustainability challenges, including overexploitation of 
resources (3); habitat destruction (4); illegal, unreported, and unregu-
lated (IUU) fishing (5); limited transparency (6); overuse of antibiotics 
(7); and forced labor (8). How to ensure that seafood is both environ-
mentally and socially sustainable has therefore become a key concern 
for industry, academics, and the general public alike (9, 10).
To date, three major pathways have been pursued to advance the 
sustainability of seafood production: through improved governance, 
including rights-based management and ecosystem approach to fish-
eries [e.g., (11, 12)]; via market-based mechanisms, such as certifica-
tion schemes [e.g., (13, 14)]; or by engaging with large corporate actors 
to promote stewardship initiatives from the industry itself [e.g., (15, 16)]. 
However, a number of recent initiatives indicate a nascent awaken-
ing to the role of finance in influencing the development of the sea-
food industry and its practices (17–19).
Financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, insurance 
companies, private equity firms, and other investors play an important 
role in shaping the global economy, which, in turn, is a major driver 
of ecological change worldwide (20). Examples from the agrifood 
business show that the relations between financiers and firms can be 
critical for understanding corporate behavior as well as farmers’ deci-
sion making (21, 22). How this may play out for fisheries and aqua-
culture, on the other hand, has received limited attention from the 
academic community.
Studies have warned that shifting responsibility for environmental 
outcomes into the incentivizing control of investment finance might 
be detrimental (23) and lead to adverse effects on small-scale fisheries 
through privatization and ocean grabbing (24). On the other hand, 
if the financial sector was to better recognize how ecological risks 
translate into financial risks, opportunities for mainstreaming sus-
tainability into seafood-related financial decisions could emerge (25). 
Until now, most of the literature on seafood and finance has focused 
on the role of subsidies (26) and the potential for impact investment 
(27). Pioneering work has examined links between illegal fisheries 
and the insurance sector (28), proposed a framework for financing 
fisheries reform (17), or assessed the risk exposure of publicly listed 
companies to seafood production (19), but more effort is needed to 
reach a comprehensive understanding of how the financial sector 
intersects with the seafood industry and where leverage points for 
sustainability may lie. By leverage points, we refer to mechanisms in 
the financial system where a relatively small shift in practices has the 
capacity to lead to fundamental changes in the system as a whole, and 
its effect on the social-ecological environment (29). This paper uses 
a mixed-methods approach to identify leverage points for sustain-
ability in the seafood-finance nexus and to discuss the possible role 
of the financial sector in seafood stewardship.
A brief introduction to finance
For readers unfamiliar with the topic, we start with an overview of the 
main financing types available to firms (Table 1). Companies have dif-
ferent options to finance their investments, and various factors affect 
the decision making, such as taxes, the business cycle, economic struc-
ture, and institutions (30). The way in which a firm is financed also 
affects its value and growth opportunities.
Firm investment can be financed internally from retained earn-
ings, which result from the surplus of revenues over costs in a particu-
lar time period. The net earnings are reinvested into the firm and 
control is kept in the company, but the growth opportunities are lim-
ited to the size of annual earnings. If the firm wants to expand, the owner 
will have to seek external financing, which entails separating ownership 
1Stockholm Resilience Centre, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden. 2Global 
Economic Dynamics and the Biosphere Academy Programme, Royal Swedish Academy 
of Sciences, Stockholm, Sweden. 3University of Birmingham Business School, 
Birmingham, UK. 4Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, 
Groningen, Netherlands. 5School of Management, University of St Andrews, Gateway, North 
Haugh, St Andrews, Fife, Scotland, UK.
*Corresponding author. Email: jean-baptiste.jouffray@su.se
Copyright © 2019 
The Authors, some 
rights reserved; 
exclusive licensee 
American Association 
for the Advancement 
of Science. No claim to 
original U.S. Government 
Works. Distributed 
under a Creative 
Commons Attribution 
NonCommercial 
License 4.0 (CC BY-NC).
 o
n
 O
ctober 21, 2019
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Jouffray et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaax3324     2 October 2019
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
2 of 11
and control (31). In doing this, the owner sells claims to future pro-
ceeds of the firm or issues promises to repay in the future. Informal 
external financing modes include funds from family and friends, trade 
credit (i.e., when a customer purchases goods or services on account 
and pays the supplier at a later date), as well as leasing of machinery 
and equipment. This type of finance grants some controlling rights to 
outsiders but is generally limited to the direct social and commercial 
network of the firm owner. External financing can also come from ven-
ture capitalists, banks, or capital markets. Venture capitalists usually 
invest in emerging firms deemed to have high growth potential with 
the aim of selling their stake within a couple of years. Banks offer loans 
of specific size and duration, and in capital markets, firms can opt for 
the issuing of equity or debt. The former is the sale of stock in the cor-
poration and happens for the first time via an initial public offering (IPO) 
of shares on the stock market. Any subsequent issuances of shares are 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Shares give their owners the right to 
a claim on the net profit of a firm (through the payment of dividends), 
as well as the possibility to vote on some decisions at the shareholder 
Table 1. Main financing mechanisms and their potential to influence a firm’s strategy. See section S1 for a glossary of all financial terms used throughout 
the paper. 
Type of financing Financing mechanism Description Potential to impact firm strategy
Internal Retained earnings Profits generated by a 
company that are not 
distributed as dividends.
None, as it is the firm itself deciding 
about the use of proceeds.
External Informal finance A broad range of 
instruments, most 
importantly trade credit 
and leasing, as well as 
financing from friends and 
relatives.
No institutional mechanism in place. 
Little potential with trade credit and 
leasing as this is usually tied to 
particular assets being prefinanced.
Venture capital A form of financing provided 
to startup companies and 
small businesses deemed 
to have high growth 
potential.
Depends on the ambition of the 
investors and where they perceive 
the enhanced value of the company 
to lie. Venture capitalists usually aim 
at selling their stake relatively 
quickly.
Debt
Loan A direct lending for particular 
projects or to the 
organization. It may be via 
preapproved credit line 
that can be drawn on 
demand. Loans are 
flexible and can be 
unsecured or secured by a 
borrower's assets, as well 
as long term or short term 
(often used for immediate 
expenses, such as 
acquisitions).
Mainly upon the closure of the contract. 
Covenants (i.e., conditions associated 
to the loan) can be written into the 
contract and are then subject to 
monitoring and enforcement. 
Supervisors of lenders may also 
require they assess nonfinancial risks 
of loans and the loan portfolio.
Bond A type of loan tradable on 
the market. It is accessible 
for large organizations 
and comes with 
requirements regarding 
disclosure of financial 
information. Usually 
organized by a group 
(“syndicate”) of financial 
institutions who try to 
place the bond issue with 
investors.
Mainly upon origination of the bond 
issue. Additional requirements can 
be written into covenants and 
subject to monitoring throughout. 
“Green” bonds use the principal 
amount or the proceeds to 
specifically further environmental 
objectives. Stock exchanges may 
require the disclosure of information 
from companies being listed.
Equity A stock market instrument 
(although it can also be 
placed privately) linked to 
the process of raising 
capital through the sale of 
shares in a company. It 
provides a claim on part of 
the profits (dividend) as 
well as voting rights.
Ownership of the share in the firm 
allows shareholder to speak up 
during annual general meetings and 
advocate particular causes or 
organize petitions among 
shareholders that can be voted. The 
higher the share, the more influence. 
Stock exchanges may require the 
disclosure of information from 
companies being listed.
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meetings (e.g., related to mergers and takeovers, change of directors, 
remuneration, and overall strategy). In the case of debt, there is a tem-
porary obligation (typically between 5 and 20 years) during which the 
firm pays interest on the debt and returns the principal (i.e., the original 
amount of funds provided) along a predetermined schedule. All types 
of financing are subject to risk for investors, especially default risk, 
which occurs when the borrower does not pay back interest or the sum 
granted. In capital markets, the financial claims on the firm are trad-
able. This allows a large number of investors but presents them with 
the additional risk of market fluctuations.
Because different types of financing have different costs and ben-
efits and because preferences among companies vary, there is no single 
way in which firms finance their assets. The pecking order theory 
holds that managers choose the least expensive capital first (e.g., in-
ternally generated funds) and then move to more costly options when 
the cheaper ones are no longer available (32). While loans and bonds 
are relatively affordable, the issuance of shares is more expensive for 
the company and often represents the last source tapped into. Dif-
ferent types of financing are not mutually exclusive, though, and firms 
often rely on diverse financing modes (30). On average, internal 
finance makes up 60% of all firm financing. Within external finance, 
bank finance accounts for 50%, followed by trade credit and equity 
finance at around 15%. Leasing and funding from government insti-
tutions (excluding subsidies or tax advantages) are about 5% each (30).
Not all financing mechanisms offer opportunities for external parties 
to influence firm strategy and policies (Table 1). Internal financing, 
for instance, provides no route to influence. Our paper therefore 
focuses on external financing to identify leverage points for sustain-
ability in the financial sector. Despite their importance for the fishing 
industry, a deliberate choice was made to exclude subsidies from the 
scope of this study because they are linked to government policy, not 
the financial sector, and have been extensively studied [e.g., (26)].
Methodological approach
While the previous section presented an overview of general firm cap-
italization mechanisms, how these are deployed across seafood firm 
development stages is not readily available in any reference material. 
To provide an empirically grounded investigation of how the finan-
cial sector interacts with the seafood industry, we therefore carried 
out a content analysis of two of the most widely recognized indepen-
dent media outlets specialized in seafood—Fishing News International 
(FNI) and Undercurrent News (UCN). This formed the basis for a 
synthetic analysis using the Weberian notion of “ideal types” to clas-
sify firms according to their scale of operations and their ownership 
structure (publicly listed or privately owned). The use of ideal types 
is a well-established method within qualitative sociology to scruti-
nize, classify, and define social reality (33). Ideal types do not refer 
to perfect observable things but rather to idea-constructs that help 
emphasize certain common attributes and can be said to best exem-
plify the phenomenon in focus (33). This approach allowed us to vali-
date the generic description of external financing mechanisms within 
a seafood context. It also served as a useful heuristic for mapping where 
different financial mechanisms are most salient along a seafood firm’s 
development trajectory and where sustainability leverage points may lie.
When quantitative data were not accessible, as for debt, we relied 
on qualitative examples identified during the content analysis to 
illustrate the mechanisms and highlight how sustainability could be 
taken into consideration. In the case of shareholding, however, data 
were readily available. We thus conducted descriptive statistics to un-
pack the shareholding pattern of 160 listed seafood companies and 
contribute to a discussion on the scope for sustainability leverage via 
equity (34). Together, the use of content analysis, qualitative examples, 
and shareholder analysis formed the basis for identifying leverage 
points for sustainability in the seafood-finance nexus and for discuss-
ing the possible role of the financial sector in seafood stewardship.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Mechanisms for financing seafood firm growth
A comprehensive summary of all financial mechanisms featured in the 
seafood media literature is found in table S1. On the basis of these 
data, we classified seafood firms into five ideal types, which differ quali-
tatively in their relative access to, and use of, capitalization mecha-
nisms as a company moves from a small-scale private business to a 
large publicly listed corporate entity (Fig. 1).
Type I refers to small (often family-run) seafood businesses whose 
access to finance is generally confined to collateral-based loans from 
a bank or private credit from trading partners—a prevalent dynam-
ic in many small-scale tropical fisheries (35). Only when a firm has 
a record of earning revenues and making profits, and thus the abili-
ty to make a credible promise to pay interest, are corporate loans a 
feasible option for conventional financiers. A firm would then fall 
into what we classify as Type II, corresponding to medium-scale pri-
vate seafood companies. Loan issuance and venture capital are key 
mechanisms by which Type II firms capitalize their businesses. Like 
any other firm that wishes to expand, a growing seafood business will 
eventually face the decision to remain privately owned (Type III) or 
become publicly listed (Types IV and V). The seafood industry dif-
fers from other sectors in that private ownership is very common even 
among the largest businesses in the sector. Of the world’s 100 largest 
seafood companies, 53% are privately held (36), in which case access 
to investment capital is secured largely through bank loans and pri-
vate placements (i.e., sales of stocks, bonds, or securities directly to 
an individual or small of group of investors, rather than as part of a 
public offering). Some seafood firms nonetheless choose to grow by 
issuing shares of stock through an IPO, thus opening up the owner-
ship of the company to the public (Type IV). At this point, the full 
range of financing mechanisms, composed of various types of debt 
and equity (see examples in table S1), becomes available. A few firms 
will grow into large public corporations (Type V), with complex owner-
ship structure and subsidiaries distributed across many countries. 
The range of financing mechanisms accessible to these firms does 
not differ substantially from the smaller publicly listed companies. 
However, the scale of capital available to, and required by, this type 
of seafood company distinguishes them from smaller operations, as 
does the potential impact on ecosystems stemming from their opera-
tions [see, e.g., (15)].
Mergers and acquisitions constitute another key mechanism for 
large seafood corporations to grow and expand. Traditionally, the 
seafood sector has been more fragmented than other food industries 
due to the existence of many niche markets (37). In recent years, how-
ever, the diversification of large companies into new species, across 
different geographies, and throughout the value chain, has led to an 
increased global consolidation in the seafood business (24, 37). In-
dustry experts suggest that the impetus behind this trend arises from 
multiple drivers, including an increasing crossover between wild- 
capture and aquaculture companies, a race to acquire fishing quotas 
and farming licenses as these continue to consolidate in the hands 
 o
n
 O
ctober 21, 2019
http://advances.sciencem
ag.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
Jouffray et al., Sci. Adv. 2019; 5 : eaax3324     2 October 2019
S C I E N C E  A D V A N C E S  |  R E S E A R C H  A R T I C L E
4 of 11
of fewer players, and the need for upstream integration from pro-
cessors and distributors (37). Consolidation also offers a way to 
mitigate risks and protect against the volatility of the sector. Conse-
quently, and combined with the projected growth in seafood markets, 
interest in seafood investments is increasing.
It is not until seafood firms have reached a certain size and cor-
porate structure (Types II to V) that intensive interaction with the 
financial sector emerges (Fig. 1). The remainder of this paper there-
fore focuses on financial leverage points for influencing the sustain-
ability of industrial-scale fisheries. We are aware that, in doing so, 
we exclude two forms of external finance often associated with small-
scale fisheries, namely, development finance and impact investment. 
These finance mechanisms play an important role in achieving de-
sirable social and environmental change (27), yet they represent only 
a small portion of the financial capital supporting the seafood in-
dustry (38). Below, we explore three leverage points for sustainabil-
ity in traditional financial services (Fig. 2) and discuss how they could 
serve to redirect mainstream investments toward more sustainable 
practices.
Banks and loan covenants
Regardless of the ownership structure of a firm (i.e., private or public), 
bank loans dominate external financing in the world’s major econ-
omies and are usually more important than stocks and bonds (30). 
Creditor banks are essential to the operations of seafood companies 
because they provide finance for all types of business activities, rang-
ing from the construction of new processing facilities and vessels to 
the acquisition of other companies and refinancing (i.e., replacement 
of an existing debt obligation with another one under different terms). 
A comprehensive analysis of loans in the seafood industry, however, 
is limited by the lack of publicly available data, making it difficult to 
estimate in a systematic way how much is being loaned, from whom, 
and for what. Instead, it is often the trade media literature that offers 
glimpses into the world of creditors and their role in the seafood busi-
ness (Box 1).
Overall, the literature on bank lending and environmental sustain-
ability remains limited [but see (39, 40)]. Yet banks hold great po-
tential for promoting sustainability given their ability to engage in 
detailed monitoring of a company and to tailor loan terms. A loan 
covenant is an agreement between the lender and the borrower, stip-
ulating the terms associated with the loan. It forbids the borrower 
from undertaking certain actions or, in contrast, requires the fulfill-
ment of certain conditions, thereby making covenants a relevant mech-
anism through which banks can incentivize companies to implement 
sustainability measures. In May 2019, for example, the agriculture 
giant Louis Dreyfus Company agreed with its lenders a $750 million 
loan for which the interest rate is linked to the company’s sustainability 
performance, as measured by a reduction in its carbon dioxide emis-
sions, electricity consumption, water usage, and solid waste sent to land-
fill. If the sustainability rating goes up, the interest goes down, and vice 
versa. Unlike blue bonds or green loans that are earmarked to finance a 
specific project, sustainability-linked covenants can be used for general 
corporate purposes. Hence, they represent a promising avenue for bank 
lending in the seafood industry to incorporate sustainability criteria and, 
ultimately, reward companies with better practices.
These criteria could draw on the recent Principles for Investment 
in Sustainable Wild-Caught Fisheries (www.fisheriesprinciples.org). 
Modeled after the Equator Principles (41) and launched in March 2018, 
Scale of operations
Small Large
Ownership
Privately
owned
Publicly
listed
Type I
Small-scale
private
Type II
Medium-scale
private
Type III
Large-scale
private
Type V
Large-scale
publicType IV
Medium-scale
public
• Private credit
• Collateral-based loans
• Loans
• Venture capital
• Loans
• Private placements
• Loans
• Bonds
• Public offerings
• Private placements
 IPO
Fig. 1. Ideal types of seafood firms. Conceptual diagram using the Weberian notion of ideal types to classify firms on the basis of their scale of operations and ownership 
structure. The five ideal types differ qualitatively in their relative access to and use of capitalization mechanisms, as a company moves from a small-scale private business 
to a large publicly listed corporate entity. Large-scale private companies (Type III) can also go through an IPO and become publicly listed (Type V). See section S1 for a 
glossary of financial terms.
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they represent a voluntary framework designed to provide guidance 
to financial institutions and ensure that investments in wild-caught 
fisheries advance environmental sustainability and social responsibility. 
The nine principles “apply globally to all debt and equity investment 
products deployed to finance a project or a company, and where the 
project or company has or is expected to have an impact on wild-
caught fisheries and their associated ecosystems and communities” 
(18). Investors are targeted as adopters of the Principles and other non- 
investor stakeholders as endorsers. As of early 2019, adopters consisted 
of impact investment funds and companies focused on sustainable 
solutions, but no mainstream bank had yet signed on to the initiative. 
Should the latter happen, and the Principles be tailored to adequately 
address the challenges of the aquaculture sector as well, they could 
provide an opportunity for the seafood investment community to 
introduce sustainability covenants in bank loans and promote this 
type of financial incentive across the industry.
Stock exchanges as gatekeepers
To open its ownership to the public, a firm has to go through an IPO 
to get listed on a stock exchange. Companies do so to access capital, 
gain exposure to broader markets, and enhance their brand reputa-
tion (42). As part of the IPO process, the firm submits a prospectus, 
a legal document highlighting its intentions and any risk or liability 
it sees in the future. This creates a unique opportunity to scrutinize 
the company and take sustainability into consideration, as illustrated 
by the IPO of China Tuna Industry Group.
China Tuna operated through its subsidiary Dalian Ocean Fish-
ing and was a major supplier of tuna to Japan. In 2014, the company 
 
SEAFOOD 
INDUSTRY
BANKS
loan covenants
STOCK EXCHANGES
listing requirements
SHAREHOLDERS
activism
SUS
TAINA
BILITY CRITERIA
Fig. 2. Leverage points in the financial sector for seafood sustainability. By integrating sustainability criteria into their investment decisions, loan covenants, stock ex-
change listing rules, and shareholder activism have great potential for incentivizing seafood companies toward better practices. Sustainability criteria should focus on, e.g., 
the absence of forced labor and IUU fishing activities, the status of fish populations and ecosystems, as well as transparency and traceability throughout the value chain.
Box 1. The power of banks.
The case of how Pescanova, the largest fishing company in the European 
Union, became Nueva Pescanova illustrates the influence that creditor 
banks can have on a firm’s trajectory. Pescanova was forced into 
bankruptcy in 2013 after it became apparent that they had undisclosed 
debt and that the company was not financially stable (56). For the purpose 
of this paper, the point of interest is how the debt restructuring process in 
the wake of the bankruptcy filings resulted in Nueva Pescanova being 
almost entirely owned by the former Pescanova’s creditor banks. First, the 
procedure saw Pescanova turn into a holding company of a new entity 
named Nueva Pescanova, to which all of its fishing assets were transferred. 
In November 2015, Nueva Pescanova’s creditor banks used debt-for-
equity swaps to collectively gain 71% of the company’s shares. A 
debt-for-equity swap is a restructuring process by which creditors trade 
the debt owed to them into equity in the company. Through these swaps, 
the syndicate of banks exchanged €667 million of Pescanova’s €725 
million debt into equity, leaving the roughly 9000 preexisting 
shareholders of Pescanova with 20% equity share in the company. The 
owner banks, then, provided more capital for the operations of the 
company (including investments in its fishing fleet) through new loan 
issuance. In an additional debt-for-equity swap in 2017, the banks gained 
further shareholder influence while reducing the stake of Pescanova in 
Nueva Pescanova from 20% to 1.7% (57). This example highlights not only 
the importance of loan capital in the financial viability of a company but 
also the power bestowed upon creditors through the process. If they were 
willing to, banks could therefore considerably influence the sustainability 
of seafood companies.
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launched a $100 million to $200 million IPO to the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange to expand their South Pacific fishing operations (43). In the 
draft IPO prospectus, as part of their risk analysis, the firm indicated 
that vessels under the Chinese flags had year on year exceeded the catch 
limits allocated to China but that noncompliance penalties were either 
non-existent or not upheld. In particular, it mentioned that because 
the Chinese Government had not set any quotas with respect to in-
dividual fishing companies or vessels, there was no risk of them being 
held responsible (see actual extracts from the prospectus in section 
S2). Following the submission of the IPO prospectus, Greenpeace 
filed a complaint with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, highlighting 
that China Tuna used outdated stock status for their assessment and 
that the environmental and sustainability risks had been overlooked. 
It also reached out to China’s Bureau of Fisheries, which strongly con-
demned the company’s actions as “gravely misleading investors and 
the international community,” and to Deutsche Bank—the sole sponsor 
of the IPO—which declined to comment (and thereafter suffered 
reputational damages) (44). This led the Hong Kong Stock Exchange to 
suspend the draft IPO before China Tuna eventually withdrew its 
application a few months later.
In this case, it remains unclear whether the issue would have been 
flagged and the IPO cancelled, if not for the complaint from Green-
peace. Stock exchanges are able to act as regulatory bodies via their 
listing rules, both during the IPO and on a continuing basis for listed 
companies. However, unlike requirements for financial and govern-
ance information, which are mandatory and have well-established 
international reporting and auditing standards, sustainability dis-
closure is still largely voluntary (45). According to the Sustainable 
Stock Exchanges Initiative database (www.sseinitiative.org/data), only 
2 of the world’s 10 largest stock exchanges require some environmen-
tal and social reporting as a listing rule. Even then, one of the two is 
a “comply-or-explain” system, whereby firms have the option not to 
disclose sustainability records as long as they justify their decision. 
Still, there is growing evidence that sustainability issues are gaining 
traction among investors, government regulators, and the stock ex-
changes themselves (46). Similar to how financial disclosure progres-
sively became the norm throughout the 1970s, today’s voluntary 
sustainability reporting and best practices may be tomorrow’s stan-
dard in compliance regulations (45).
Within the seafood industry, stock exchanges seem particularly 
well placed to promote greater transparency and influence sustain-
ability. A review of the world’s 100 largest seafood companies (36) 
indicates that the publicly listed ones are highly consolidated into a 
handful of stock exchanges (Fig. 3). The Tokyo Stock Exchange alone 
concentrates 53% of the combined revenue of listed seafood companies, 
while the largest four (Tokyo, Oslo, Korea, and Thailand) together 
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Fig. 3. Seafood revenues in stock exchanges. Cumulative revenues of the world’s 45 largest publicly listed seafood companies by stock exchange. The Tokyo Stock 
Exchange concentrates 53% of total revenues, while the largest four together account for 86%. The asterisks indicate stock exchanges that have social and environmental 
reporting as a listing rule, according to the Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative database (www.sseinitiative.org/data).
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account for 86%. Only one of them, the Stock Exchange of Thailand, 
currently requires environmental and social reporting as a listing rule. 
If more stringent sustainability requirements were to form part of 
the mandated information needed for the IPO process and ongoing 
listing, stock exchanges would constitute powerful gatekeepers to 
ensure that seafood sustainability criteria are incorporated into the 
practices of publicly listed firms.
Shareholder ownership
Once a company gets listed, the percentage of stock ownership de-
termines the share of voting rights and the extent to which any one 
investor can affect corporate decisions. The required stake to have 
effective control differs across firms, but shareholding of at least 5% 
is generally assumed to entail substantial influence (47). There are 
two main mechanisms for large shareholders to influence a firm’s 
governance. The first one, known as “voice,” includes voting and 
direct engagement with management (e.g., private letters, meetings, 
and public shareholder proposals). The second one, known as “exit,” 
consists of selling the shares (or threatening to do so), which signals 
discontent and may push down the stock price (47). Recent studies 
have documented the role of large financial actors in the global 
network of corporate ownership (48) and pointed out the increasing 
level of activism among investors (49). Institutional shareholders of 
listed seafood companies could therefore offer leverage to enhance 
sustainability.
Our analysis of more than 3000 shareholders of 160 seafood 
firms, however, shows a remarkable modularity in the network of 
investors and companies (Fig. 4A). The absence of key nodes indi-
cates that most seafood companies have a unique cohort of large 
shareholders and that no single investor holds substantial stocks in 
many companies, thus indicating limited leverage potential. Notably, 
the pattern remains similar for parent shareholders (fig. S1). Looking 
at the nature of the owners further reveals that the proportion 
accounted for by financial institutions decreases as the ownership 
share increases, whereas the percentage of individuals and nonfinancial 
corporations rises (Fig. 4B and table S2). On the other hand, the 
cumulative investment of shareholders across all seafood companies 
shows that financial institutions are by far the largest investors in 
terms of market capitalization (Fig. 4C and data file S1). This illus-
trates a conventional risk spreading strategy whereby financial 
investors buy small ownership stakes in a multitude of companies. 
The distinct types of shareholders also underscore geographical dif-
ferences, with more than half of all individuals and 87% of non-
financial corporations based in Asia, while financial institutions are 
primarily European (42%) and North American (27%) (table S2). 
Overall, we observe a home bias where the predominant shareholders’ 
region matches the company’s headquarters location (fig. S2). Whether 
these geographical patterns entail differences in how the financial 
sector can be engaged for increasing sustainability is an important 
question that remains to be explored.
These results suggest that equity currently holds limited potential 
for financial actors to affect seafood corporate governance and pro-
mote sustainability. The seafood industry is already characterized by 
a large number of privately owned companies with unknown share-
holder structure and thus little leverage. Our findings indicate that, 
even for publicly listed companies, individuals and nonfinancial cor-
porations are the most prevalent investors with shares large enough to 
be influential (Fig. 4B). While individuals can be instrumental in their 
own right, they are less susceptible to public pressure than institutional 
investors such as pension funds and sovereign wealth funds. The ob-
served pattern of institutional shareholders injecting large amounts of 
capital into an industry but with little stake in any one company could 
thus be conceived of as a “financial commons dilemma,” where power-
ful financial investors lack the incentives to monitor individual firms—
at least in the seafood sector (Fig. 4). This situation is unlikely to change 
as long as investors remain uninterested in or unaware of the social- 
ecological impacts of their investments.
Toward a social-ecologically literate financial sector
While some of the leverage points identified above hold promise for 
steering the seafood industry toward more sustainable practices, invest-
ments are ultimately meant to maximize profits in relation to risks. 
Any transformative potential is therefore unlikely to be realized unless 
financial institutions become (i) more aware of the social-ecological 
risks associated with seafood production, (ii) appreciative of how these 
are likely to translate into financial and reputational risks, and (iii) will-
ing or compelled to transform their own practices toward improved 
sustainability accordingly.
Numerous sustainable finance initiatives have emerged in recent years, 
showing an increased attention to social and environmental issues. From 
the Equator Principles and the Sustainable Stock Exchange Initiative to 
the Principles for Responsible Investment and the growth of the green 
bond market, there are signs that finance is aware of its potential. 
However, these initiatives or instruments are mostly voluntary and 
represent only a tiny fraction of global financial flows. For instance, 
green bonds, let alone blue ones, amount to less than 0.6% of the total 
bond market (25). What is needed, instead, if sustainability concerns 
are to become mainstream, are new norms and regulations that can 
redirect the bulk of corporate finance toward improved sustainabil-
ity (Fig. 2). Crucial to this process is the disclosure by seafood com-
panies of their nonfinancial activities and performance. This requires 
integrated reporting of both financial and nonfinancial information 
to allow investors, financiers, and other stakeholders to better assess 
firm performance and risks. Overall, seafood companies should be 
screened to ensure that they do not violate human and labor rights 
(8), engage in IUU fishing (5), or operate under flags of noncompli-
ance and tax haven jurisdictions (50). Drawing on the disclosure of 
what species of fish are caught, how much, when, and where, particular 
attention must be paid to the ecological status of fish populations as well 
as potential impacts on wider marine ecosystems (2). Financiers should 
also request traceability and transparency throughout the value chain 
(51), including catch documentation schemes and systematic dis-
closure of metrics such as biomass produced, amount of antibiotics 
used, and percentage of eco-certified products (7, 14).
Nonfinancial risks tend to be an important predictor of company 
and industry-specific financial risks (52). However, it requires improving 
the ability of financial actors to articulate, understand, and translate these 
data to market insights. In this respect, initiatives such as the Ocean Dis-
closure Project (www.oceandisclosureproject.org), Fish Tracker (www.
fish-tracker.org), or the Principles for Investment in Sustainable Wild-
Caught Fisheries (www.fisheriesprinciples.org) can help foster col-
laboration and provide guidance to financiers. The information also 
needs to be independently audited to ensure its validity and reliability. 
Where it is not yet the case, national and international regulation 
regarding financial reporting and accounting must therefore be ex-
panded to also include nonfinancial information. Governments should 
enforce provision of this type of reporting by treating it on par with 
the requirements of financial accounting and reporting standards. 
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Likewise, stock exchanges could promote the use of nonfinancial and 
industry-specific criteria by demanding that listed companies com-
ply with the proposals and framework of the Sustainability Account-
ing Standards Board (www.sasb.org) or the Global Reporting Initiative 
(www.globalreporting.org). The Sustainable Stock Exchange Initia-
tive provides a relevant platform to enable these reforms in combi-
nation with regulatory pressure from finance ministries. In case 
seafood companies stop complying, this could result in their demo-
tion to a lower-tier exchange or even delisting. Many fishing and 
aquaculture companies may not have a listing on an exchange but 
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Fig. 4. Shareholder ownership. (A) Network of publicly listed seafood companies and their shareholders for different share values representing relative thresholds of 
potential influence over corporate operations and governance. Network density (overall level of connectivity of the network measured as the proportion of actual con-
nections relative to the total number possible) is very low in all three cases. The network for all ownership shares (i.e., >0%) has too many nodes and links to be visualized 
in a clear way. Explore interactive versions of the networks at https://jbjouffray.github.io/SeafoodFinance/networks. (B) Proportion of all shareholders accounted for by 
financial institutions, individuals, and nonfinancial corporations for different share values. See table S2 for proportions split by regions and additional shareholder types. 
(C) Cumulative market capitalization across all seafood companies by shareholder types.
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will receive external finance via banks. Loan covenants can then spec-
ify the type of information to be provided to the bank and require 
that the company adhere to international norms and standards. Vio-
lation of covenants could trigger default clauses upon which the 
company has to pay a fine to the bank or even repay the loan and all 
financial obligations related to it, de facto ending the arrangement.
Pressure from civil society organizations and the general public 
will be important to promote awareness and stimulate regulatory 
responses. A number of approaches have emerged to sensitize the seafood 
sector to the importance of sustainability, from eco-certifications aimed 
at informing consumers’ choices, to lobbying by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) on how the industry needs to improve (some-
times targeting specific companies with naming and shaming cam-
paigns), and through the proliferation of private governance initiatives. 
Here, we argue that sustainability screening and industry-specific 
considerations must become the norm for investments in the seafood 
industry, in the same way as financial auditing currently is. Banks, 
stock exchanges, and shareholders alike could have incentives to do 
so because the company’s social and environmental performance will 
directly or indirectly feed back to the financier and may yield finan-
cial and reputational benefits (53).
Future research should aim at testing the reality of these incentives 
and exploring each of the leverage points in more depth. For bank 
loans, the focus must be on identifying keystone banks in the seafood 
industry and assessing their willingness to set up new norms of sus-
tainability requirements for credit lending, similar to the exercise 
undertaken by Österblom et al. (16) regarding the world’s largest 
fishing and aquaculture firms. For stock exchanges, efforts should aim 
at reviewing the listing rules of the ones that concentrate seafood 
revenues (Fig. 3) and evaluating the possibility to implement more 
stringent sustainability disclosure requirements. For shareholders, an 
empirical assessment of the relationship between financial perform-
ance and social and environmental ratings should be conducted for 
both the seafood companies and their investors. See Gonenc and 
Scholtens (54) for a comparable analysis on fossil fuels firms. Beyond 
the mechanisms elaborated here lies a whole spectrum of research 
avenues to further investigate the relevance of finance as a leverage 
for sustainability. This includes a focus on proxy voting service providers 
as well as greater attention to the role of credit rating agencies and 
large accounting firms that assess and audit most of the financial trans-
actions and thus could constitute powerful change agents.
CONCLUSION
In an epoch when considerable efforts and technologies are deployed 
to track fishing vessels in near real time (www.globalfishingwatch.org), 
following the money is no less important and deserves increased 
attention from both scholars and policymakers. Many lessons can 
be drawn from the literature on financialization in the agrifood sector, 
which describes the growing influence of finance at the expense of 
producers, consumers, and the environment (22). Accordingly, we 
do not advocate the emergence of new “green” investment tools but 
rather a radical and deliberate transformation of how seafood sus-
tainability is integrated into traditional financial services—either at 
their own initiative or via regulation. This would also improve the 
effectiveness and efficiency of financial institutions with respect to 
the materiality of nonfinancial information. Given the projected de-
mand for seafood and the magnitude of the challenges associated 
with its production, we regard our identification of leverage points 
in the financial sector as a crucial avenue to not only complement 
but also promote existing governmental, market-based, and corpo-
rate efforts toward increased sustainability.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Content analysis of seafood news literature
The content analysis proceeded in two steps and included all 
FNI monthly issues (2008–2014; n = 84) and UCN online articles 
(2012–2017; n = 29,865). The limited set of FNI issues constituted a 
comprehensive, yet small enough, sample to allow an exhaustive 
manual coding of all articles. On the basis of this review, a codebook 
with search terms was developed and subsequently applied to the in-
dependent set of articles in the UCN archives to narrow down the 
number of articles to be analyzed in detail. The content analysis was 
done using MAXQDA 12.3.3.
Codebook development entailed reading FNI articles and conduct-
ing exploratory coding of all topics related to the financial sector. Any-
thing relevant to finance was marked to identify three elements: a 
financial entity (provider of capital), a seafood company (recipient), 
and a mechanism through which capital flowed from the financial 
provider to the recipient (fig. S3). A financial entity was defined as 
an institution that has, or assembles, funds for investment. A sea-
food company was defined as a company implicated in the seafood 
value chain, regardless of it being primarily involved in the capture, 
aquaculture, processing, or retailing sector. Through the explorato-
ry coding, a set of preliminary search terms that were deemed nec-
essary to capture all articles of interest was identified with a focus on 
financial mechanisms (table S3). Using either recipients or provid-
ers as key search terms would have limited the analysis to these spe-
cific companies or institutions, and made it impossible to discover 
any additional types of actors and mechanisms not covered by the 
FNI archives. Each identified search term was then assessed for rel-
evance by conducting a systematic lexical search of the word within 
all FNI articles and measuring how many times the term appeared 
within or outside a coded segment. Words with low relevance, such as 
“stock” that can refer to financial stock (equity) but was mostly used 
in relation to fish stock, were not retained (table S3). In step two, the 
refined list of terms was applied to the entire UCN online archives, 
and a total of 1246 articles were retrieved using Python version 2.7.13 
(table S4). Each article was read in its entirety to identify the type of 
financial mechanisms and, where available, the recipient and provider. 
A Jupyter notebook with the data extraction code as well as the list of 
all articles’ URLs are both available on request.
To summarize the detailed accounts uncovered by the content anal-
ysis, and to draw out generalizable insights, we relied on the Weberian 
notion of “ideal types” to classify firms on the basis of their scale of 
operations and their ownership structure (publicly listed or privately 
owned). Ideal types are models, each representing a class (group of 
objects) with particular characters that can be said to best exemplify 
the phenomenon in focus—in our case, the intersection of finance 
with the seafood industry. Using ideal types allows to extend exam-
ination beyond the uniqueness of individual cases and develop an 
understanding of what commonalities exist between cases (55).
Quantitative analysis of shareholder ownership
We conducted descriptive statistics of shareholder ownership in the 
seafood industry based on the publicly listed companies with seafood 
involvement identified by McCarron (19) (table S5 and data file S1). 
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Shareholder information was retrieved from the FactSet Ownership 
Download Builder on 23 October 2017 (www.factset.com) using the 
“all shareholder” view to account for any unconsolidated or unlisted 
part of the company. We focused on market capitalization and the 
percentage of ownership, defined as the proportion of outstanding 
shares of the company held by any investor. The completeness of 
the data depended on company disclosure. We found information for 
160 companies with a combined market capitalization of $520 billion, 
an average of 57% ownership disclosed, and 3250 unique share-
holders consolidating into 2561 parent shareholders (e.g., 16 different 
BlackRock funds consolidating into “BlackRock Inc.”) (data file S1). 
More than 93% of all listed companies were engaged in processing/
wholesale. Of those, 32, 25, and 10% were also involved in aquaculture, 
capture fisheries, or both, respectively. Only four companies were 
engaged only in capture, and seven were engaged only in aquaculture 
(data file S1).
Web searches for each shareholder name were conducted to 
classify unique shareholders into five broad categories: financial 
institutions (n = 1832; e.g., banks, insurances, pension funds, private 
equity firms, hedge funds, and mutual funds), individuals (n = 732; 
including family- owned trusts), nonfinancial corporations (n = 610; 
e.g., private and public companies, holding companies, and business 
associations), foundations/nonprofit (n = 18; e.g., foundations, 
endowments, and nonprofit organizations), and governments 
(n = 12, including sovereign wealth managers). Forty-six shareholders 
(mostly private companies) could not confidently be classified into 
one of these categories (data file S1). Analyses and network visual-
izations were performed using R version 3.3.2 with a focus on own-
ership values above 5 and 10%, representing identified thresholds of 
potential influence over corporate operations and governance (47). 
Statistical scripts and data are available on GitHub (https://github.
com/JBjouffray/SeafoodFinance).
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